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ABSTRACT 
In “The Principles of Prevention and the Development of the Prevention Triangle 
Model for the Evaluation of Terrorism Prevention,” we propose the theoretical and 
practical development of the “Prevention Triangle,” a graphical model designed to define 
a system for evaluating national, state, and local terrorism prevention mandates and 
programs.  Based upon objectives detailed in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, and derived through an analysis of selected prevention theories and programs – 
primarily those aimed at crime prevention – this study first seeks a theoretical basis for 
the prevention of terrorism in the form of four principles before deriving and defining 
representative evaluative criteria for designing and measuring the efficacy of prevention 
programs.   
As conceived, the Prevention Triangle has through dispositional and experiential 
theory, further application to the ritualizing of many of the strategic and operational 
components associated with the present alliance against global terrorism.  This reflects 
our understanding that while the theoretical premises and evaluative proxies of 
contemporary terrorism prevention theory largely rely on situational prevention strategies 
and tactics, the true measure of any prevention mandate is more akin to dispositional and 
experiential prevention, in that it occurs over time, and though societal change and 
communal observation, and is therefore more accurately evaluated through the 
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This thesis is about the prevention of terrorist attacks against the American 
homeland.  It is about the reasons why we need to practice, as a nation, the prevention of 
these terrorist attacks.  It is about the difficulties and inconsistencies inherent in 
conceptualizing terrorism prevention, and the necessity for us to conceptualize new types 
of prevention concepts if the national terrorism prevention mandate is to fully succeed.  
And it is as much about the search for a universal language of terrorism prevention as it is 
an attempt to develop a model for harnessing this common definition for the purposes of 
implementation and evaluation. 
As will be indicated, this thesis does not concern itself so much with the 
prevention of terrorism, as it does the with prevention of terrorist attacks.  It can be 
argued that they are, in essence, one and the same, and that to address one is to resolve 
the other.  But by this very same logic, we can hypothesize that the enormous number of 
variables inherent in terrorism as a strategy, coupled with the vast resources and 
capabilities required to prevent or mitigate the many motivations that lie behind 
terrorism, make it a largely unachievable objective. 
Instead, and as will be evidenced in this thesis, it is an easier and more 
comprehensible strategy to instead attempt the prevention of terrorist attacks, rather than 
simply the root causes of terrorism.  Certainly, a dual-pronged approach to resolving the 
terrorism phenomena is desirable, but not if it comes at the cost of American security, 
prosperity, or liberty. 
This thesis is also about the building of a model, a theoretical model that those 
organizations responsible for implementing terrorist prevention strategies and tactics can 
refer to in designing their programs.  In this thesis, we propose the theoretical and 
practical development of the “Prevention Triangle,” a graphical model designed to define 
a system for evaluating national, state, and local terrorism prevention mandates and 
programs.  Based upon objectives detailed in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, and through an analysis of selected prevention theories and programs –  
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primarily those aimed at crime prevention – this study first seeks a theoretical basis for 
the prevention of terrorism before deriving and defining evaluative criteria for designing 
and measuring the efficacy of prevention programs. 
As conceived, the Prevention Triangle has, through dispositional theory, further 
application to the ritualizing of many of the strategic and operational components 
associated with the present alliance against global terrorism.  This reflects our 
understanding that while the theoretical premises and evaluative proxies of contemporary 
terrorism prevention theory largely rely on situational prevention strategies and tactics, 
the true measure of any prevention mandate is more akin to dispositional and experiential 
prevention, in that it occurs over time, and though societal change and communal 
observation, and is therefore more accurately evaluated through the development of long-
term baseline data.   
Crime prevention theorists Tonry and Farrington caution us that without baseline 
data, it is very difficult, if not nearly impossible, to accurately observe and quantify 
prevention strategies.  “…most shops have no valid measure of shoplifting that can be 
used before or after prevention strategies are implemented.”1  If we consider prevention 
measures implemented to prevent or reduce the situations under which shoplifting occurs, 
it is not difficult to draw a similar connection between the concept of situational 
prevention in general, and the need to derive a baseline to measure situational 
prevention,in  particular. 
Those students and practitioners of Homeland Security who are interested in 
implementing terrorism prevention programs, and then evaluating their effectiveness, 
should remember a 1991 article titled, “The Public Administrator as Hero,” by 
Christopher Bellavita.  Here, Bellavita draws upon the metaphor of a “dragon that roams 
the countryside destroying everything in its path…Into this slough of despondency comes 
the hero, the man or woman who takes on the task of bringing new life to a dying land.”2  
Through a penetrating analysis of empirical and situational data, Bellavita links the 
improvement of government efficiency and morale to an understanding of public officials 
and administrators as heroes, or people whose “stories” were “structurally similar to what  
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Joseph Campbell (1968) called ‘the hero’s journey’…”  “What emerged instead,” 
Bellavita concluded, “were stories about people overcoming forces to bring new vitality 
to stagnant systems.”3
The development of the Prevention Triangle, with its multi-capacity approach to 
evaluating prevention through the general proxies of Objectives, Capabilities, and 
Hostilities, is one possible tool that the public administrator can use in his or her hero’s 






























II. THE PROBLEM 
Prevention has been selected as one of the principal strategies by which the 
United States and its partners in the global alliance against terrorism have chosen to 
address the general issue of international terrorism, and the more specific mission of 
preventing terrorist activity within the American homeland. 
In 2002, the federal government promulgated the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, which established three objectives that are derived from, and apply to, the 
prevention of terrorist acts:  “1) Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 2) 
Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and; 3) Minimize the damage and recover 
from attacks that may occur.”4   
For the purposes of this thesis, we are essentially interested in all three objectives, 
but with particular emphasis on the first, “prevent terrorist attacks within the United 
States.”  It is our view that if this objective is successfully achieved, the other two 
mission areas will prove less important to the overall success of preventing terrorist 
activity within the nation’s borders, or against its significant overseas interests. 
But there are innumerable challenges within this approach, and this thesis seeks to 
resolve some of these issues.  For instance, what are the theoretical and dynamical 
definitions for the prevention of terrorism?  If we analyze and determine this theoretical 
and dynamical basis, can we then derive a graphical or mathematical representation for 
defining prevention?  And if we are successful in this undertaking, will it be subsequently 
possible to develop a system for actually evaluating prevention, measuring it much as we 
attempted to evaluate crime prevention programs in the past? 
There are dozens of different studies and assessments of prevention already in 
existence.  Past prevention models have addressed this sense of different types of 
prevention by following the public health model, which describes Primary, Secondary, 
and Tertiary prevention.  But these models are limited by their emphasis on prevention as 
observed through action, without realizing that what it is really attempting to do is 
establish a hierarchy of importance as it relates to prevention. 
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As is the case with all government initiatives, there is also an important fiduciary 
aspect to the efficiency and effectiveness of any nationwide terrorism prevention strategy.  
In fiscal year 2004, the USDHS Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), the arm of the 
department tasked with overseeing the National Exercise Program, expended $20 million 
on preparedness exercise planning, support, and implementation, all geared toward 
realizing an enhanced degree of terrorism prevention.  Since 1998, ODP has provided 
more than $7 billion in homeland security funding for equipment, training, exercises and 
planning – a considerable sum of money that implies diligence and commitment, but as 
of yet perhaps defies complete evaluation.5  As mirrored by Tonry and Farrington, “High-
quality evaluation research designs are needed to convince leading scholars, as well as 
intelligent policy makers and practitioners, about the effectiveness of crime prevention 
techniques.”6  And the same rationale can be applied to the effectiveness of our terrorism 
prevention systems. 
However, the ongoing debate on which type of prevention theory to employ has 
seemingly mired the implementation of a national terrorism prevention mandate in 
paralyzing uncertainty.  This thesis, through an analysis of past crime prevention theory, 
added to an analysis of evaluation concepts, yields a model for prevention that we are 
calling “The Prevention Triangle.”  And unlike most of the literature currently in 
existence, we actually provide a theoretical proof for the dynamics and outcomes of the 
Prevention Triangle model.  Once we have evidenced that prevention can be modeled, 
and once we have illustrated how that model can be evaluated, we are then in a position 
to provide a conceptual proof for how the Prevention Triangle operates.  These proofs are 
the evaluative criteria for the implementation of prevention baseline data. 
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III. THE METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in constructing this thesis is primarily comparison and 
contrast, and is geared principally toward an analysis of crime prevention and program 
evaluation theory.   Because our end objective is to devise a graphical model that can be 
used to define and implement a terrorism prevention evaluation system on the national, 
state, and local levels, our methodology reflects the step-by-step process on which broad 
theoretical relationships are constructed, then applied to real world problems. 
1. We analyze, through comparison and contrast, the effectiveness of past crime 
prevention theories and programs.  From this we derive base principles of 
terrorism prevention. 
2. We analyze, through comparison and contrast, how these programs were 
evaluated.  This includes an analysis of proxies and evaluation criteria.  From 
this we derive base principles for the evaluation of terrorism prevention. 
3. Based upon these principles, we construct a logical proof and graphical model 
for the concept of terrorism prevention. 
4. By applying evaluative theory to our prevention model, we derive an 
additional model, the Prevention Triangle.  It is crucial to remember that 
without first providing proof for the model, we cannot apply the model to the 
prevention challenge. 
5. Our methodology is itself triangular in logic, an implied hierarchy that we can 
then arrange into a triangular representation.  As will be evidenced, the 
triangle is the most appropriate logical and graphical model for this purpose. 
We also employ two primary analogies as part of our methodology.  One involves 
a young child and its guardian within an average home setting, and the other the events of 
September 11, 2001.  These analogies, which are not as divergent in context as one might 
believe, are important to our understanding of prevention and evaluation theory, not only 
as illustrations for sometimes challenging theoretical concepts, but also as theoretical 
proofs for many of these same concepts. 
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During this study, it has not been our intent to answer every possible nuance in 
the definitional standard of prevention, nor has it been our primary objective to design 
individual prevention programs for every jurisdiction in the nation.  As Hatry states, 
“…governmental programs seldom can be adequately evaluated by attempts to compress 
multiple measures into a single criterion such as a single monetary measure.”7
Rather, our study objective has been to cull from a voluminous canon of literature 
and thought, policy and practice, the theoretical reasons why we should want to evaluate 
or measure our effectiveness in preventing terrorism and acts of terrorism; how we 
should identify this information; and what evaluative measures we should employ to 
uniformly assess the information. 
Through the development and application of the Prevention Triangle model to the 
National Strategies for Homeland Security and for Combating Terrorism, we have 
derived viable answers to these and other questions.  Along the way, it has at times 
become necessary to alter preexisting notions of prevention theory and implementation in 
order to devise an evaluative system that both diagnoses and evaluates progress or 
enhancement in those areas subject to observation.  Heidinsfield tells us, “The limitations 
of the method [for evaluating crime prevention] are due to the restrictions imposed by its 
underlying assumptions.”8  This prevention-based enhancement allows for the systematic 
quantification of both strengths and deficiencies on all jurisdictional levels, and the 
eventual development of a large baseline for evaluating similar programs in a nationwide 
measure of prevention.   
Because a prevention-based evaluation system seeks to more closely connect all 
preparedness programs with the national objective of preventing acts of terrorism, the 
chosen indicators must reflect the use of proxies, specific components in the prevention 
matrix that can be observed.  It should be noted that owing to the amorphous dynamics of 
most evaluation systems, social programs are generally considered experimental - 
“…social programs are usually best viewed as experiments which can seldom be 
conducted under identical circumstances over time.  Hence, measurements of 
effectiveness must be adaptive over time in order to be relevant to dynamic systems,”9 – 
and are therefore composed of diverse and often-changing evaluation standards.  Because 
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no prevention program is or will be absolutely effective in preventing each and every act 
of terrorism, or each and every act of planning an act of terrorism, finite and specific 
target objectives related to prevention must be first defined.  As will be seen, these target 
objectives are dependent upon a host of variables, the most important among them the 



















IV. THE PRINCIPLES OF TERRORISM PREVENTION 
During the course of this thesis, we will apply four primary principles relating to 
the prevention of terrorist attacks to reaching a better understanding of the theoretical 
nature of terrorism prevention.  Some of these principles, such as the First Principle, are 
commonly known and understood, and serve essentially as a definition of the problem.  
The need to include the definitional standard of terrorism as a principle on which 
terrorism prevention principles are based is obvious.  Within the context of the Principles, 
it permits a common theoretical reference point, as well as a refinement of the objectives 
to which the Principles are being applied.  Other principles, such as the Third and Fourth 
Principles, have been developed as part of this thesis, as a result of our analysis of 
existing prevention theory. 
 
First Principle 
Terrorism is the strategy of using asymmetrical warfare tactics to create fear and 
disruption with the objective of causing governmental or societal change. 
 
Second Principle 
The Prevention of Terrorist Attacks relies on three constituent theories of prevention: 
Situational, Dispositional, and Experiential. 
 
Third Principle 
Situational, Dispositional, and Experiential prevention are hierarchical in arrangement, 
with Experiential prevention informing Dispositional prevention, and Dispositional 
prevention informing Situational prevention.  Because of this, the loss or diminishment of 
one or more of the three constituent theoretical elements nullifies the effectiveness of all 






The First through Third Principles make it possible, through the application of observable 
criteria, to evaluate the effectiveness of a terrorism prevention model. 
 
There is one additional principle related to prevention (the Fifth Principle) which 
we derived while researching this thesis, but have chosen not to use as a base principle 
for the evaluation of prevention theory.  The Fifth Principle is suggested by the findings 
of this thesis, and therefore falls outside of its limited purpose and scope.  It is therefore 
discussed in greater detail in the conclusion. 
 
Fifth Principle 
The prevention of terrorism is not an infallible concept.  The inclusion of the experiential 
prevention factor states that occasional terrorist activity is necessary to maintain higher 
levels of situational and dispositional prevention. 
 
We will now analyze each of these principles. 
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V. FIRST PRINCIPLE 
Terrorism is the strategy of using the tactics of asymmetric warfare to 
create fear and disruption with the objective of causing governmental or 
societal change. 
It is necessary for us to employ the definitional standard of terrorism as our First 
Principle because it is the unique strategic and tactical nature of terrorism, with its 
emphasis on asymmetric warfare, which we are essentially attempting to prevent.  In 
order to understand the prevention of terrorist attacks, we must first understand what it is 
precisely that we are preventing.  As we earlier determined, it is not as important that we 
practice the prevention of terrorism as it is that we practice the prevention of terrorist 
attacks.  Part of the difficulty with defining and implementing a national strategy has 
been prompted by concerns that because the nation may not possess either the objectives 
or the capabilities to prevent terrorism as a political phenomenon, it similarly does not 
possess the objectives or the capabilities to prevent terrorist attacks within the American 
homeland.   
By basing our theoretical construct on the First Principle, however, we can better 
determine where terrorist attacks might prove most destructive, and identify areas where 
prevention operations could be most effectively employed.  In order to accomplish this, 
we must first identify the base response elements for terrorist attacks, namely, 
Interdiction, Response, and Redundancy. 
For the purposes of terrorism prevention, Interdiction can be defined as the timely 
application of response and support assets to the interruption of a terrorist organization’s 
objectives.  Equally well known as the preemption concept, and variously defined by the 
studies of Corrado and Davis, Cillufo and Tomarchio, and Rose, interdiction has grown 
in definition and objective to include active response mechanisms, such as information 
gathering and intelligence analysis, and the deployment of specially trained and equipped 
counterterrorism teams.10  The National Strategy for Homeland Security stipulates the 
expansion of the interdiction discipline through the recognition that, “Actionable 
intelligence is essential for preventing acts of terrorism.  The timely and thorough 
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analysis and dissemination of information about terrorists and their current and potential 
activities allow the government to take immediate- and near-term action to disrupt and 
prevent terrorist acts…”11  According to the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 
the, “…prevention of catastrophic terrorism is dependent upon interdiction of people and 
materials.”12   
Interdiction can occur at any point in the planning and execution phases, and is 
preferably conducted during the early stages of a terrorist operation, before any 
opportunity for expansion or implementation is realized.  In his article, “Genesis of 
Suicide Terrorism,” Atran warns of the difficulties inherent in the interdiction phase:  
“The last line of defense against suicide terrorism – preventing bombers from reaching 
targets – may be the most expensive and least likely to succeed.”13  But while Atran is 
correctly pessimistic about the uses of interdiction during the end-game aspects of a 
terrorist action, he nonetheless recognizes the value of interdiction during earlier stages 
of the planning and implementation phases.  “A middle line of defense, penetrating and 
destroying recruiting organizations and isolating their leaders, may be successful in the 
near term…”14 
Response is the ability of a jurisdiction to deploy personnel and other resources to 
the amelioration of terrorist events.  While many terrorism scholars tend to categorize 
response as a part of interdiction, in that it is through response that terrorist acts are 
interdicted or thwarted, our definition of response focuses on peri- and post-event factors.  
In other words, the speed, efficiency, and efficacy by which response assets in a 
particular jurisdiction respond to unfolding acts of terrorism essentially determines how 
successful that event is in achieving its destructive objectives.  If, for instance, a 
jurisdiction were understaffed or under-equipped, it would be that much easier for 
terrorist organizations to exploit those weaknesses – and they can only be considered 
gaps – in conducting acts of terrorism.  In this way, rapid and effective response is a form 
of deterrence in that terrorist organizations are less likely to attack a particular locale or 
jurisdiction if it is generally known (or determined by terrorist surveillance operations) 
that a rapid response will reduce the death toll, or quickly douse the resultant fires, or 
repair critical infrastructure nodes.  The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism  
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recognizes the importance of response in the prevention of terrorism by observing that, 
“…solid plans, preparations, and immediate response remain key to mitigating acts of 
terrorism.”15 
In the field of emergency management – or the practice of authorizing an 
independent agency to serve as an interagency coordinator for preparedness and response 
operations – the use of the word, “mitigation,” is often taken to reflect not only the 
lessening of the deleterious effects of catastrophes, but also those measures taken in 
advance of an event to prevent that event from occurring.  For instance, the installation of 
smoke and carbon monoxide detectors in residences and commercial spaces is an 
example of mitigation in that through their operation, potential victims are forewarned of 
the presence of fire or lethal gasses, and are thus able to affect a rapid escape.  In this 
example, smoke and carbon monoxide detectors are mitigation measures taken to prevent 
the loss of life that all-too-frequently occurs when fire breaks out, or invisible carbon 
monoxide gasses permeate a location.  In either definition, response is an element within 
the mitigation discipline, and it is not too difficult an undertaking to recognize its 
inherent life-saving value. 
The third and final pillar in traditional prevention theory – redundancy – is also 
the newest.  Redundancy refers to that capability, whether on the federal, state, or local 
level, that deters or prevents terrorist attacks through the need to debilitate multiple 
locations or assets.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security contains extensive 
provisions for improving redundancy through the increased protection of critical 
infrastructure facilities.  “Protecting America’s critical infrastructure and key assets will 
not only make us more secure from terrorist attack, but will also reduce our vulnerability 
to natural disasters, organized crime, and computer hackers.”16  This versatility of 
approach is, in and of itself, a redundancy, and potently illustrates how vital a critical 
node the redundancy component is to the prevention strategy. 
Primarily applied to issues of infrastructure security, redundancy can further be 
applied to response assets.  For example, following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, 
several New York City-based financial services firms, including the New York 
Mercantile Exchange and the iconic New York Stock Exchange, spent millions of dollars 
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constructing redundancy locations that would be used in the event another terrorist attack, 
or a large-scale catastrophe, were to close or disable the organizations’ respective trading 
floors.17  The importance of redundancy in terms of maintaining economic continuity, as 
well as making it more difficult for terrorist activities to pose a significant threat to the 
economic wellbeing of the nation, was recognized by the General Accountability Office, 
which in early 2003 issued a white paper to the United States Congress.  This document, 
which surveyed 15 primary financial organization – exchanges, clearing houses, 
electronic communications networks and payment system processors – stated that these 
industries were at greater risk of disruption because their redundancy locations were 
situated less than ten miles from their primary operational sites, or that they had no 
backup centers at all.18  In a follow-up report issued in September of 2004, the GAO 
concluded that while progress had been made, “…four of the eight large trading 
firms…had all of their critical trading staff in single locations, putting them at greater risk 
than others of a single event incapacitating their trading operations…actions were taken 
to improve the resiliency of the telecommunications service critical to the 
markets…Maintaining telecommunications redundancy and diversity over time will 
remain a challenge.”19
While the redundancy doctrine has been principally applied to critical 
infrastructure nodes, the same logic is viable when discussing federal, state, and local 
response assets.  These assets can extend from backup locations for critical government 
or response operations, such as New York City’s alternate Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC), to Alternate Seats of Government (ASOG), which provide secure locations for 
the purposes of Continuity of Government (COG) planning and operations, to 
redundancy in specific response applications, like hazardous materials (HAZMAT) units.  
By including redundancy as a primary element in the prevention matrix, jurisdictions can 
protect the continuity of their public safety response operations, while simultaneously 
deterring or dissuading terrorist operations planning by presenting additional layers of 
protection.  Adapting the example set by Geis and Huston, deterrence is not simply 
predicated upon size, but also upon response versatilities. 
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Like an enormous theoretical gearbox, the definition of terrorism as a type of 
warfare committed against a nation’s interdiction, response, and redundancy capabilities 
permits a greater understanding of the dynamics of terrorism, and how it can be defended 
against.  If terrorism is essentially waged against those environments in which 
interdiction, response, and redundancy are integral (i.e., transportation, financial, 
governmental networks), then any theoretical terrorism prevention concepts must have 
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VI. SECOND PRINCIPLE 
The Prevention of Terrorism relies on three constituent theories of 
prevention: Situational, Dispositional, and Experiential. 
Social scientists have long recognized that there are two primary schools of 
deterrence theory, situational deterrence and dispositional deterrence.  And as evidenced 
by the long history of crime prevention strategies, most criminal events – and here we can 
substitute terrorism for criminal – are composed of two components or stages based upon 
these situational and dispositional elements.20  In his analysis of situational crime 
prevention strategies, Clarke outlines the two components:  “…first, a description of the 
nature and distribution of criminal opportunities (Sparks, 1980) and, second, an account 
of how offenders’ decisions are affected, not merely by facts of upbringing and personal 
history, but also by the circumstances and situations in which they find themselves.”21  
The first assessment, which is clearly applicable to the opportunistic aspects of terrorist 
activities, is drawn from situational factors.  The second, which is more traditionally 
dispositional in nature, refers to the contextual motivations for terrorism, including geo-
political characteristics.  There are, additionally, subsets of these two theoretical 
polestars, including, “law enforcement, and developmental, community, and situational 
prevention.”22   
A. SITUATIONAL PREVENTION 
The oldest and perhaps most obvious prevention strategy involves situational 
factors, or those elements of crime and terrorism that are based upon what could be called 
circumstantial or situational contexts.  Clarke, who has spent many years analyzing the 
systemic mechanics of crime prevention, characterizes situational prevention as, 
“…measures (1) directed at highly specific forms of crime (2) that involve the 
management, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and 
permanent a way as possible (3) so as to reduce the opportunities for crime and increase 
its risks as perceived by a wide range of offenders.”23   
We have all practiced situational prevention in our daily lives.  The locking of the 
front door when we leave the house, the snuffing of lighted candles when we leave the 
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room, the training of a watch dog – these are just three of many examples of situational 
prevention.  By making it more difficult to gain access, or prevent a fire from occurring, 
or providing us with the early warning of a bark, we are changing the situations under 
which destructive or injurious incidents can occur. 
This logic has served as the definitional construct for most contemporary crime 
reduction programs, such as those aimed at reducing skyjacking incidents, shoplifting, 
and even suicide.  In the example of skyjackings, the deployment of advanced detection 
technology and practices has significantly reduced the number of terrorist or criminal 
operatives who are able to access aircraft and airport facilities with weapons and 
explosive devices.  “Some sorts of crime have been dramatically reduced by removing 
not the targets but the means to commit the crimes.  For example, the incidence of aircraft 
‘skyjacking’ has been reduced from an annual average of about seventy in the early 
1970s to the present rate of about fifteen a year by screening passengers and 
baggage…”24  In a celebrated 1988 study, Clarke and Mayhew provide compelling 
evidence that, “Between 1963 and 1975 the annual number of suicides in England and 
Wales showed a sudden, unexpected decline…at a time when suicide continued to 
increase in most other European countries.  This appears to be the result of the 
progressive removal of carbon monoxide from the public gas supply.”25
Situational prevention is also often practiced aboard commercial vessels engaged 
in trade in waters known for the large number of pirates.  This includes the outfitting of 
merchant vessels with electronic tracking devices, as well as the posting of increased 
deck patrols, the use of fire hoses, the full lighting of the vessel, and even large sums of 
money that can be given to the pirates should they successfully board the vessel.  In this 
particular instance, situational prevention is primarily geared toward preventing the death 
or injury of any of the ship’s crew members, and the loss of the vessel and its cargo to 
either piracy or destruction.  It is not aimed at preventing piracy, or as a first line of 
defense, necessarily preventing the pirates from accessing the vessel.26
But for the purposes of law enforcement, situational prevention – not dispositional 
- has been the dominant theoretical dialectic of the crime prevention rubric.  In 1983, 
when the British Home Office established its Crime Prevention Unit, it was interpreted to 
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mean that, “…situational crime prevention has grown rapidly as a viable strategy for 
reducing the occurrence of crimes.”27  On the other hand, there are those observers who 
have rightly suggested that no crime prevention program is always effective, and that in 
order to improve their degree of effectiveness, an interagency, multi-capability – or 
Chimera – approach is required.  Tonry and Farrington reaffirm the viability of this 
method by stating that, “…there is an emerging consensus among researchers and public 
officials in many countries that law enforcement’s potential effects are limited and 
modest and that public safety policies that rely solely or primarily on law enforcement are 
incomplete and insufficiently protect the public.”28  This suggests that in order to prove 
effective, prevention strategies must be broad in scale but specific in implementation, and 
should bridge the operations of several agencies or organizations, as well as different 
approaches to the combating of terrorism. 
In February of 1993, terrorist operatives attempted to destroy the North Tower of 
the World Trade Center through the detonation of a truck bomb in a parking garage 
beneath the Trade Center complex.  In response, the World Trade Center’s operators 
prohibited trucks from entering the parking garage.  This is an example of situational 
prevention.  The opportunity to launch a type of terrorist operation (vehicle-borne 
bombing) was lessened (i.e., prevented) by implementing physical security measures.  
Using the evaluative criteria outlined in the Fifth Principle, we can quantify these actions 
in a manner beyond that of simple observation. 
But as evidenced on September 11, there are limitations to the efficacy of 
situational prevention methods.  This is not due to a flaw or deficiency in the concept of 
situational prevention, but rather in its limited scope.  Because it is situational, it is 
naturally limited by its immediate circumstances or environment.  For example, improved 
situational prevention measures at the airports where the flights originated, as well as 
aboard the individual aircraft themselves, may have prevented the successful hijacking of 
these aircraft; but because situational prevention methods were not superior to either the 
objectives or capabilities of the hijackers, the World Trade Center’s own situational 
prevention methods were likewise rendered insufficient.   
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This is the logic that supports and yet hinders the dynamics of situational 
prevention; because it is situational, it is limited in range to its immediate environment 
and circumstances.  And because, as seen in our example, it is subject to all the variables 
of all the situations and circumstances that daily occur in life, it can never be completely 
and adequately used as a primary prevention concept.   
In the past, several attempts have been made to define a prevention concept that 
does not share the same deficiencies of scope as situational prevention.  Deterrence is one 
such example, and is probably the most pervasive theory of its kind.  Deterrence is the 
practice of deterring criminal or terrorist activity through the imposition of programmatic 
and security measures that make it difficult, if not impossible, for either criminals or 
terrorists to achieve their respective objectives.  “Law enforcement has a significant 
deterrent effect on robberies, burglaries, and motor vehicle theft.”29   
Deterrence theory perhaps found its most significant – and successful – role in the 
nuclear deterrence strategies of the Cold War (1946-1986).30  Tonry and Farrington 
attribute the fundamental processes of criminal justice to the concept of general 
prevention, where, “…deterrence is offered as the primary purpose and justification for 
the maintenance of state-administered systems of criminal punishment,”31 in that the 
fearful prospect of state-sanctioned penalties ranging from the imposition of fines, to 
imprisonment, to execution is sufficient deterrent to the conduct of criminal activity.  In 
Book 1 of The Discourses, “How Necessary Public Indictments are for the Maintenance 
of Liberty in a Republic,” the famed Renaissance political theorist, Niccolo Machiavelli, 
suggests that fear of punishment can serve as a strong deterrent to, “…such citizens as 
have committed any offense prejudicial to the freedom of the state.  Such an institution 
has two consequences useful in a republic.  First, for fear of being prosecuted, its citizens 
attempt nothing prejudicial to the state…”32  And Zimring and Hawkins, drawing upon 
the deterrence through strength paradigm, define deterrence as, “…the declaration of 
some harm, loss, or pain that will follow noncompliance.”33  As manifested by the Cold 
War example, where the United States and the former Soviet Union stridently sought the 
numerical and tactical advantages inherent in the number of nuclear warheads and their 
respective destructive capabilities, a strategy of deterrence is most effectively realized 
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from a position of size or strength.  Studies conducted by Geis and Huston (1983) on the 
role of bystanders as defined by the Good Samaritan laws in California, indicate that the 
physical size of participants plays a significant role in the successful outcome of such 
activity.  “The important variable…was the size and strength of the bystander, vis à vis 
the victim.”34  The Islamist terrorist organization Hamas is aware of this connection, as 
indicated by an adage frequently employed by the group:  “Why hunt lions when there 
are so many sheep about?” 
But just as deterrence has been successfully used as a primary prevention strategy 
for centuries, it has an equally long history of incompleteness, debate, and even failure.  
An analysis prepared by the British Home Office in 1991 attributed some of the 
challenges faced by strategic deterrence to the spontaneous nature of many crimes, and 
even the psychology and character of the respective offenders themselves.  “Deterrence is 
a principle with much immediate appeal…But much crime is committed on 
impulse…and it is committed by offenders who live from moment to moment…’”35  If 
the Home Office’s premise is accepted, then deterrence is, in fact, an effective prevention 
model against terrorism because terrorism, with its long planning and organizational 
requirements, can not be successfully committed on impulse.36  Title 22 of the US Code 
further recognizes the planning element inherent in acts of terrorism when it defines 
terrorism as, “…premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to 
influence an audience.” [Author’s italics]. 
Considering the relative efficacy of the Cold War strategy of deterrence on the 
prevention of a nuclear exchange between the United States and the former Soviet Union, 
it is not surprising that following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the United States in part adopted the deterrence model for application to this new form of 
asymmetric conflict.  In 2002, the federal government promulgated the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security, which established three objectives that are derived from, and 
apply to, the prevention of terrorist acts:  “1) Prevent terrorist attacks within the United 
States; 2) Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and; 3) Minimize the damage and 
recover from attacks that may occur.”37  In February of 2003, the federal government 
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further issued the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which relies heavily on the 
doctrine of deterrence to mitigate acts of terrorism, and essentially reiterates the three 
strategic objectives outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.  Because the 
long history of crime prevention programs has evidenced that no prevention policy is 
100% effective under all conditions and situations, the National Strategy calls for the, 
“…prevention of catastrophic terrorism,” or those acts of terrorism that rely on large-
scale activities to achieve their objectives.  It does not focus on acts of what we call 
micro-terrorism, or those acts conducted by single individuals that result in less than 100 
deaths. 
Moreover, as the events of September 11 illustrate, by itself the effectiveness of 
situational prevention practices are often limited by their range.  In order to expand the 
situational range, in order to fill this gap in a terrorism prevention system, we must apply 
an additional layer of prevention, one known as Dispositional prevention. 
B. DISPOSITIONAL PREVENTION 
Sometimes referred to as social prevention, dispositional prevention, unlike 
situational prevention, tends to emphasize the elimination or amelioration of social ills or 
inequalities as a method for reducing or preventing crime.  A product of developments in 
psychology and community relations, dispositional prevention, “…seeks – though with 
little demonstrated effect (Morris and Hawkins 1970; Wilson 1975) – to ameliorate the 
social, psychological, economic, and educational deficiencies that are thought to give rise 
to criminal dispositions.”38  Tonry and Farrington take a similarly dim view of the 
efficacy of dispositional prevention programs, attributing their concerns to the more 
finitely-codified community prevention subset, and the difficulties in evaluating such a 
broad range of inputs in terms of a long-term outcome.  “…the effectiveness of 
community prevention is less convincing than for situational or developmental 
prevention.  This is at least partly because of the poor quality of evaluations of 
community prevention strategies, which makes it difficult to draw lessons from the future 
of perceived failures.”39  And yet, because of the experimental nature of many social 
programs, it is perhaps necessary to account for dispositional factors in the prevention of 
terrorism.  A 1972 report issued by the Committee on Measures of Effectiveness for 
 25
Social Programs stated that, “…social programs are usually best viewed as experiments 
which can seldom be conducted under identical circumstances over time.  Hence, 
measurements of effectiveness must be adaptive over time in order to be relevant in 
dynamic systems.”40
But while we cannot always effectively address the dispositional aspects or root 
causes of terrorism, we can adapt the theoretical premise of dispositional prevention for 
the purposes of hindering some of the more deleterious social effects of terrorism, 
including the ramifications of specific acts of terrorism.  Using dispositional prevention 
theory, it is possible for us to devise programs geared toward preventing (or at least, 
managing) the magnitude of fear that often defines the age of asymmetric warfare.  If, for 
instance, terrorist organizations were to realize that terrorist acts do not always engender 
paralyzing and disruptive fear on the part of their victims – if terror were removed from 
terrorism – then the objectives of terrorism would be neutered.  The organizational 
theorist, James Q. Wilson, suggests as much when he writes, “Prevention and educational 
programs can reduce supply as well as demand.”41  While Wilson’s findings do not as 
readily apply to the prevention of terrorism on a dispositional level, they do support the 
understanding that they can prevent a degree of the “demand” for terrorism; here, demand 
is defined not as the satisfaction of a need, but as the destructive by-products of its 
occurrence.   
As suggested by Schneider, the traditional prevention policies of “rehabilitation” 
and “incapacitation” – which are conceptually linked to the traditional definition of 
dispositional theory - are of limited value in combating terrorism, with the latter 
containing, through the interdiction strategy, more practical import than the former.  
While some terrorism scholars have suggested “in-group policing” strategies designed to 
appeal to the more moderate elements within terrorist organizations, or those 
contemporary cultures which rely on terrorist strategies to achieve their political 
objectives, there is little evidence that the rehabilitation of individual terrorists or of 
terrorist organizations has or will yield the desired results.42   
Incapacitation, on the other hand, is much closer to the prevention mark, and has 
been practiced as an integral part of the present campaign against global terrorism.  Since 
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the terrorist atrocities of September 11, 2001, the United States and its allies have 
aggressively pursued al-Qaeda’s (the terrorist organization that by its own admission 
planned and conducted the September 11 attacks) membership, and has either killed or 
captured much of its top leadership and individual cadres.  As the continuing spate of 
terrorist outbreaks in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate, incapacitation – while in essence a 
sound and effective strategy – is not the silver bullet it was once believed to be.  It is 
essentially a long-term strategy, one whose effectiveness is often hampered by 
displacement, or the phenomenon, well known to law enforcement theorists and 
practitioners, whereby incidents of crime or terrorism decrease in one location, but 
increase in others.  Incapacitation, and by extension, interdiction, is further offset by 
increases in organizational proficiency and membership recruiting.   
In many respects, the September 11 terrorists were able to exploit weaknesses in 
both our situational and dispositional prevention systems.  In order to reconcile these 
differences, we must reassess our understanding of dispositional prevention theory, and 
instead determine that for the purposes of terrorism prevention, dispositional prevention 
relies on changing the environment in which situational prevention exists. 
Whereas traditional dispositional crime prevention theory held that in order to be 
effective, dispositional methods needed to change the environments that produced 
criminal behavior, we are defining dispositional prevention as applied to the prevention 
of terrorism to represent those measures taken to coordinate and enhance situational 
prevention techniques.   
Let us take a moment to analyze why for our purposes it is necessary to redefine 
the traditional definition of dispositional prevention.  Since dispositional crime 
prevention theory was first introduced, it has focused on preventing or controlling crime 
by making changes in the environments in which crime is able to grow.  Poverty and 
political disenfranchisement are two traditional dispositional causes for crime, and there 
is sufficient evidence to suggest that the application of financial and other resources can 
have a positive, if limited and often expensive, effect on crime prevention and reduction 
figures. 
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But if this same dispositional logic is applicable to the dispositional prevention of 
terrorism, why have a majority of terrorist cadres actually been individuals drawn from 
the educated middle-class?  Because according to our first principle of terrorism 
prevention, terrorism is politically motivated, its dispositional manifestations must be 
drawn from a different set of strategic and tactical motivators.  Those individuals who are 
dispositionally predisposed to commit acts of terrorism are therefore dispositional for 
other reasons, primarily political, which defy traditional dispositional remedies.   
The logical premise that disposition, therefore, changes with circumstances does 
not allow it the constancy to be adequately measured.  It is akin to the analogy where a 
child has entered our kitchen, and to prevent that child from being burned by the hot 
stove, we remove the stove entirely.  Under traditional dispositional precepts, we have in 
fact practiced dispositional prevention by changing the environment through the removal 
of the stove. 
And yet, we have also prompted the question of whether or not by removing the 
stove, we have so changed the environment that we can no longer call it a kitchen.  Of the 
two traditional crime prevention theories, dispositional theory has always been 
considered the hardest to evaluate for effectiveness, and the most expensive method for 
achieving that effectiveness.  One of the ways in which dispositional prevention theory 
does not logically support its objectives is through displacement, or the concept that by 
improving the physical or economic environment in one area, crime and its dispositional 
roots are merely displaced or transferred to another.  Here our stove in the kitchen 
analogy is a sound logical proof; by removing the stove from the kitchen to the bedroom, 
we have actually accomplished little by way of prevention.  We still need to turn on the 
stove to cook, and our curious child will enter the bedroom as easily as the kitchen. 
In order to logically reconcile these variables with what is in essence an important 
prevention theory, we have revised the traditional definition of dispositional prevention to 
describe those situational measures taken in response to changes in our dispositional 
thinking.  The contradictory aspects of traditional dispositional crime prevention theory 
indicate that while the concept of dispositional theory is possible, affecting it on 
individuals or groups by second or third parties is ineffective.  In order to realize its full 
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benefits, it is therefore necessary that we apply it to ourselves, to those who would seek 
to prevent terrorist attacks, not those who perpetuate them.  In its simplest form, this 
contention posits that dispositional prevention theory is much more useful when applied 
to what we can, in fact, dispositionally influence rather than to those who must be 
dispositionally changed by indirect or distant means. 
Accordingly, those industry-wide measures taken in the airline industry to 
improve situational prevention systems – improved ground security, improved passenger 
screening, flight deck door hardening, enhanced crew training – are an example of the 
results of dispositional prevention.  Rather than attempt to change the disposition of 
terrorists in order to prevent terrorism, we have chosen to change our own disposition 
toward preventing terrorism, thereby allowing us to enhance our prevention effectiveness 
through increased coordination of our objectives and capabilities. 
Since September 11, no aircraft that has implemented the new situational and 
dispositional prevention measures has been hijacked.  Were these situational prevention 
methods not coordinated by the larger change in dispositional prevention policies and 
practices, this degree of effectiveness could not be realized.  It is further interesting to 
note that logically, these methods are working.  In 2002, a British national, Richard Reid, 
attempted to destroy a transatlantic jetliner by detonating explosives contained within his 
shoes.  The situational prevention improvements realized by the dispositional prevention 
mandate were so effective that no attempt could obviously be made to duplicate the 
tactics used on September 11. 
C. EXPERIENTIAL PREVENTION 
We have been able to deduce the existence of experiential prevention in much the 
same way as the planet Pluto was discovered in 1930.  By taking observations of 
perturbations in the planet Neptune’s orbit, astronomers were able to deduce the 
existence of another entity, most likely a planet, that could not itself be seen, but whose 
influences and effects could nonetheless be predictably observed through the actions of 
neighboring bodies. 
By studying the theoretical and dynamical relationship between situational 
prevention theory and our revised dispositional prevention theory, we have been lead to 
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identify the existence of a third branch or school of prevention theory, one that we are 
calling Experiential Prevention.  We know that experiential prevention must exist 
because of the behaviors and observable results of the other two concepts, situational and 
dispositional prevention, that have been defined, and can be observed. 
For instance, we know what situational prevention is, but why and how does it 
actually work?  We have defined and redefined dispositional theory, but again, what 
influences its recognition and implementation?  Because both situational and 
dispositional prevention are inherently defined by change, what series begins the starting 
point, and where does that change lead? 
Our mysterious “planet,” therefore, must be experience, or perhaps, the awareness 
of the experiences associated with terrorism and acts of terrorism.  This awareness is 
what we are calling experiential prevention, or the concept of prevention that is based 
upon experience or observable connections between certain behaviors and results.  In its 
simplest form, experiential prevention occurs when one (and by extension, groups 
composed of individuals) experiences terrorism, and is able to evaluate situational and 
dispositional prevention strategies and tactics in light of this experience and its enhanced 
awareness.   
Here we may return to our curious child in the kitchen:  situational prevention 
occurs when we possess the capability to turn off the hot stove to prevent the child from 
being burned; dispositional prevention occurs when we know to turn off the stove, and 
possess the desire and disposition to do so; and experiential prevention occurs when we 
do not practice either situational or dispositional prevention, but rather allow that child to 
touch the hot stove, experience the painful consequences of its actions, and therefore 
develop a self-awareness that in its manifestation is experiential prevention.  In the latter 
example, the child will be much less likely to touch the stove the next time, thereby 
possessing the dispositional motivation to practice a form of self-situational prevention. 
The dynamics of the Intelligence gathering and analysis function, for instance, are 
a logical proof for the mechanics of experiential prevention.  Intelligence, which falls 
under the Interdiction rubric of our First Principle, relies on the increased awareness 
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provided by experience, or the effect of personal or group observation.  As more 
information is gathered and analyzed, the chances of increasing the effectiveness of 
situational and dispositional prevention methods are greatly improved.  We have a much 
larger chance of apprehending terrorist operatives because of this increased knowledge, 
and the interdiction operations that can be implemented because of it.  
In this way, we can see how Intelligence is not primarily situational or 
dispositional in mechanics, but rather, experiential in effect.  It realizes its effectiveness 
through regular, daily exposure to the activities and thinking of terrorist organizations.  
We can and do use Intelligence for situational prevention – increased security, physical 
plant hardening, personnel and resource deployment – and for dispositional prevention 
purposes, in that increased knowledge through experience leads to the development and 
implementation of policies and administrative practices that provide the dispositional 
prevention function.  But neither situational nor dispositional prevention concepts explain 
how Intelligence works within the prevention matrix; experiential prevention, however, 
allows for Intelligence to be evaluated through a series of criteria based on longevity and 
resource deployment, including HUMINT resources. 
We earlier discussed Richard Reid, and his unsuccessful attempt to destroy a 
transatlantic passenger jet with an explosive pair of shoes.  Had Reid been successful in 
his mission, we may never have known what destroyed that aircraft.  We would have 
speculated and held inquiries, and most likely sought to retrieve the wreckage from the 
seabed, but we would never have known with certainty where our present dispositional 
and situational prevention measures failed.  It is entirely possible, therefore, that this 
terrorist modus operandi would have been subsequently used several times, with possibly 
equally fatal and mysterious results. 
This is the clearest logical proof we have that experiential prevention is a viable 
component in the development of our Second Principle.  Because of the experience of 
Reid’s attempt, the awareness of his technique, we were subsequently able to use 
dispositional prevention (through the organizations involved with airline security) to 
enhance situational prevention measures (the removal of shoes during the screening 
process) to improve the efficacy of our overall prevention program. 
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VII. THIRD PRINCIPLE 
Situational, Dispositional, and Experiential prevention are hierarchical in 
arrangement, with Experiential prevention informing Dispositional 
prevention, and Dispositional prevention informing Situational 
prevention.  Because of this, the loss or diminishment of one or more of 
the three constituent theoretical elements nullifies the effectiveness of all 
terrorism prevention operations. 
According to our logic, as an independent prevention concept, experiential 
prevention is difficult if not impossible to implement without reference to both situational 
and dispositional prevention theory.  While a nation may experience an act of terrorism 
and in the course of doing so be made aware of deficiencies (and conversely, strengths) in 
its situational and dispositional interdiction, response, and redundancy objectives and 
capabilities, the simple act of increased awareness is not in all cases sufficient to result in 
the prevention of terrorist activity.  As we will prove, there are many instances in which 
experience and its resulting awareness is effective as a form of deterrence, both in the 
example of the terrorist organization that carries out attacks and is punished, and in those 
organizations that are deterred from launching their own attacks by the awareness of what 
has happened to others as a result of committing terrorist attacks. 
And yet, as we have suggested, the best form of prevention is not an offensive 
posture that relies on the activities of second or third parties, or upon indirect means of 
enforcement, but upon that which we can implement using a fusion of our objectives and 
capabilities in a defensive attitude.  It may seem paradoxical, but it appears from our 
principles and that of deterrence theory that, as the defensive quality of prevention 
measures increases, the offensive quality increases, as well. 
This logic, in turn, allows us to recognize the importance of experiential 
prevention in informing or evaluating situational and dispositional prevention concepts.  
As experience and increased awareness of terrorism and terrorist activity improve or 
result in positive changes to our dispositional prevention systems, situational prevention, 
which is the lowest (in the hierarchical scale as determined by its function) additionally 
improves.  Therefore, the enhancement of situational and dispositional prevention 
practices because of the effects of experiential prevention indicates that while, like the 
others, it cannot operate very effectively as a single component, its place within any 
comprehensive terrorism prevention model is essential. 
We have seen in our logic examples for the Second Principle how situational, 
dispositional, and experiential prevention are compatible in terms of their objectives, 
capabilities, and definitions.  Now we must establish the logical means by which the 
dynamics between the three components can be conceptualized, and their relationship to 
one another weighted according to their respective effects on one another. 
The self-referential quality of the Austrian logician Gödel’s Incompleteness 
Theorems forms the theoretical inspiration for our construction of the Third Principle.  
While the three definitions of situational, dispositional, and experiential prevention serve 
to define terrorism prevention concepts, the arrangement of the three concepts 
necessitates a triangular graphical model.  This is due to the hierarchical nature of the 
dynamics between the three prevention concepts.  We could render the model as a linear 
hierarchy, but this would not place the Experiential prevention (EI) function as a divisor 
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The Theoretical Prevention Triangle allows us to see an additional layer of 
interaction, with situational and dispositional prevention being “evaluated” or informed 
by the precepts of our experiential prevention concept.  We have seen in the 
enhancements undertaken to situational and dispositional prevention methods subsequent 
to September 11, 2001, and in response to the Richard Reid incident, how experience, or 
increased awareness of those situations that can be ameliorated or mitigated by situational 
and dispositional prevention methods, is used to evaluate gaps in situational and 
dispositional prevention programs. 
This logical deduction means that any graphical model for evaluating the 
effectiveness of prevention programs must also include within it the means of evaluation.  
Just as the experiential leg of the theoretical triangle informs and is informed by the 
situational and dispositional legs, it is only through the inclusion of the experiential proxy 
that we are able to produce self-referential criteria that serve as logical constants.  
Interdiction and Response are primarily situational in nature, while Deterrence 
and Redundancy are at once both situational and dispositional, with, we believe, a slight 
emphasis on the latter.  They are situational in that they are often characterized by 
specific responses to events, and hence possess a near-term reactive quality; and they are 
dispositional as they imply a change in the way terrorism is perceived, and often rely on 
long-term solutions in order to prove effective.  A prevention mandate that seeks to 
diagnose and evaluate both situational and dispositional factors immediately becomes a 
part of each.   
For a logical proof of this conceptual relationship, let us return to our example of 
September 11, 2001.  For illustrative purposes (the concept of HO or Hostilities), we will 
also need to anticipate an element in our conceptual model, the Prevention Triangle.  As 
evidenced by the findings of the 9/11 Commission and other investigations, there were 
numerous points during the planning and operational phases when the operation could 
have been disrupted or even stopped.  Under our conceptual system, this would have been 
accomplished through traditional forms of situational and dispositional prevention.   
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Although our overall objective may have been to prevent acts of terrorism, the 
component situational prevention activities, uncoordinated by a lack of capabilities 
(including organizational) of a dispositional prevention nature, resulted in the Hostilities 
component overcoming these deficiencies in planning and execution, and resulted in the 
worst terrorist attack yet seen in contemporary history.  Just as the experiential leg serves 
as an evaluative constant to the prevention concept, Hostilities serves the same function 
within efforts to practically apply prevention as part of the Prevention Triangle concept. 
Our understanding of this relationship, therefore, allows us to use (HO) as a 
mathematical divisor.  It is an easy logical argument to follow.  If the combined 
components of (CP-SI) and (OB-DI) are greater than (HO-EI), then positive prevention is 
or will occur.  Clearly, while improvements had been made to the World Trade Center’s 
state of situational prevention after the 1993 attack, in 2001 they were offset by lingering 
deficiencies in the OB-DI columns, thereby lowering the total sufficiently enough to 
permit HO the advantage.  Therefore, in order to offset HO, both OB and CP must be 
enhanced. 
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VIII. FOURTH PRINCIPLE 
The First through Fourth Principles make it possible, through the 
application of observable criteria, to evaluate the effectiveness of a 
terrorism prevention program based upon the fusion of Situational, 
Dispositional, and Experiential prevention theories. 
Now that we have defined the theoretical basis for the prevention of terrorist acts 
through the Theoretical Prevention Triangle, we must turn our attention to the theoretical 
foundations of an evaluation system.  Here our objective is to determine, based on the 
literature of prior experience, what evaluation systems have been developed and 
implemented for previous crime prevention theories and programs.  During this process, 
it will be necessary to keep in mind the four principal tenets of prevention – deterrence, 
interdiction, response, and redundancy – in order to derive indicators that will serve as 
outputs leading to the desired end outcomes.43  Throughout this process, it is additionally 
important to comprehend and recognize the differences between examples of situational, 
dispositional, and experiential prevention, and derive evaluative measures that are unique 
to the operational nuances inherent in each example.  And based upon our findings, we 
will be able to extract more specific indicators, and integrate them into a cohesive 
evaluation model, the Prevention Triangle. 
As applied to our present purpose, evaluative theory is nearly as old as crime 
prevention theory itself.  Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, in their 1936 analysis, Preventing 
Crime,44 state, “…no system has been established which accurately measures the results 
of crime prevention programs.  It will never be possible to prove what specific crimes 
have been prevented, but it is true that for the Crime Prevention Bureau, the number of 
juveniles taken to court for serious offenses showed a marked decline.”45  In 1935, 
Bellman proposed, “…the rating of a police organization according to certain standards, 
and the improvement of service.  This is to be done through the application to all police 
departments of a standard rating scale on a basis of points.”46  Bellman drew his 
inspiration for what he called, “The German theory,” where, “…if the performance of any 
function is entirely unsatisfactory, no point will be awarded under that category.”47  
Three years later, Parratt recommended a “Scale to Measure Effectiveness of Police 
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Functioning,” which presented, “…a picture of police effectiveness in terms of public 
approvals and disapprovals.”48  Although they sought to evaluate different aspects of the 
policing function, both the Bellman and Parratt methods relied on questionnaires and 
interviews for their respective base data, as well as some quantitative measures.   
In 1941, Heidinsfield unveiled his analysis, “The Role of Statistics in Evaluating 
Community Efforts on Crime Prevention,” in which he concluded that, “Although there is 
no single index that will give a comprehensive picture of police effectiveness, a 
satisfactory record system will yield a number of items of information useful in 
administration control.  The most significant information regarding crimes against the 
public morals, disturbance of the peace and similar offenses, is the number of persons 
charged by the police.”49  And in their 1982 evaluation study, Jobson and Schneck 
returned to the Parratt model with their, “Constituent Views of Organizational 
Effectiveness:  Evidence from Police Organizations.”  In this application, the researchers 
derived ten criteria that would be used to measure the effectiveness of the policing 
function as observed by the general public,50 including hierarchical evaluation, crime 
rate, solve rate, perceived effectiveness, seriousness of crime, safety in environment, 
process behavior, task performance, importance of organization, and participation in 
community.51
Much of our contemporary evaluation literature, however, is drawn from the 
“Crime Analysis” approach advanced during the 1980s by Ekblom and others.  The 
Crime Analysis rubric, drawing upon largely situational examples, “involved obtaining 
detailed information about local patterns of crime, devising prevention strategies 
appropriate to local problems in the light of these analyses, implementing the strategies, 
and evaluating the effects of the prevention strategies on crime.”52  Tonry and Farrington 
describe the current paradigm as, “…the systematic strategic effort of the last decade to 
develop and test situational techniques and the increasingly widespread recognition that 
situational approaches can complement law enforcement approaches.”53
Whether applied to the prevention of crime or the prevention of terrorism, the 
development of a practical evaluation system is a difficult undertaking.  The challenges 
stem not so much from deficiencies or variances in prevention theory and strategies, but 
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rather from the vast number of factors to be evaluated, and the innumerable influences 
that define and drive those same factors.  “In evaluating the success of prevention 
strategies,” write Tonry and Farrington, it is important to investigate the boundary 
conditions under which they work.  For example, a strategy may be effective in one place 
or at one time but not in other circumstances, perhaps because of societal or contextual 
variations…”54  Similarly, Clarke adds, “The difficulty posed for situational measures is 
one of the vast number of potential targets combined with a generally low overall level of 
security.”55  And Hatry cautions that, “…governmental programs seldom can be 
adequately evaluated by attempts to compress multiple measures into a single criterion 
such as a single monetary measure.”56
We can also see from our readings that the concept of experiential prevention is 
observable in the ways crime prevention theory and evaluative practice have evolved 
based upon the observable response to, and awareness of, their perceived and actual 
effectiveness.  Since most literature on the subject – including this thesis – is based upon 
the adaptive use of successful theories or concepts, the idea that experience can itself 
serve as a qualitative measure, that it has a quantifiable quality to it, is very important to 
constructing the prevention hierarchy described in our Third Principle. 
And not every scholar has been convinced of the efficacy of situational prevention 
theory or practice.  In his 1990 analysis of the relationship between drugs and criminal 
activity, James Q. Wilson writes:  “Some people argue that we must ‘stamp out’ drug 
abuse in order to reduce crime, break up criminal gangs, and improve public health.  But 
there is no reason to believe that vigorously enforcing the drug laws will achieve any of 
these goals and many reasons to think that they may make these matters worse.”57  Nor 
does Wilson subscribe to the primary aspects of developmental protection, suggesting 
that, “…attempting to suppress the use of drugs is costly – very costly.”58  This approach 
to prevention is in keeping with those beliefs espoused by Schneier and others, and 
frequently manifests itself in the limited or select application of prevention strategies. 
Still, each of the evaluation theories proposed over the last century have elements 
that are adaptable for the purposes of designing a method to evaluate prevention.  From 
Jobson and Schneck, we derive an understanding of the importance of functional 
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observations on the evaluation of prevention.  “In this undertaking criteria of 
effectiveness will be examined from the perspectives of both internal participants and 
external constituents and thus begin to fill a major void in past investigations of 
effectiveness.”59  This includes an adaptation of utility theory, whereby, “Recent 
developments in utility theory give some appreciation of the two main directions taken to 
measure effectiveness of non-profit entities, 1) adequacy or inadequacy ratings, 2) cost 
benefit measures.”60  The application of the utility theory to a program aimed at 
prevention would indicate the use of evaluators that are measured in terms of resources, 
or outputs.  From Tonry and Farrington, we obtain the essence of an evaluation system, 
and the role that system has on the prevention of terrorism.  “In evaluating situational 
prevention programs, it is essential to plan to measure possible displacement and 
diffusion of benefits.  In addition, it would be desirable to measure possible indirect 
prevention, for example, where a reduction in drug use leads also to a reduction in 
burglary and robbery…”61   
Essentially, the authors are suggesting that the prevention of terrorism may not be 
a direct result of prevention efforts, but rather a by-product of programs that have a much 
broader applicability to the suppression of crime and other situational factors.  Jobson and 
Schneck further tell us that, “First, indicators of organizational effectiveness have 
centered on the utilities of organizational participants, such as incumbent decision 
makers, directors, and employees, rather than on the desires of client groups and the 
public interest.  Second, most of the data available for criteria research have either been 
collected or supplied by the focal organization.”62   
We must define the theoretical foundations for evaluation.  Once this has been 
completed, an evaluation system can be adapted for use in the terrorism prevention 
mandate.  The challenges inherent in a prevention evaluation program are obvious.  First, 
there is the pervasive philosophical and political debate as to whether or not prevention 
can be implemented, and whether or not it can be evaluated.  As viewed by Schneier, 
“Prevention  is  what  everyone  thinks  about  first,  but it’s actually the hardest aspect of  
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security to implement successfully, and often the most expensive…You can make it 
harder for the kidnappers, but you can’t stop them totally.  You simply can’t buy enough 
prevention, and the trade-offs are too great.”63
Second, a series of criteria to be used for the purposes of evaluation must be 
identified.  Third, an objective system employing these criteria must be prepared.  As 
there are certain indicators that can be used to evidence the efficacy of a terrorism 
prevention program, it should not prove too difficult to derive a series of criteria for the 
purposes of evaluation.  In 1982, Jobson and Schneck defined the theoretical challenges 
inherent in the selection of evaluation criteria.  “The development and use of criteria is 
essentially a political decision that ultimately reflects someone’s values (Campbell, 1977; 
Scott, 1977).  If the selection of criteria is never purely an objective research task, then it 
is partially a function of choice and values; the choice of the particular organizational 
theories and models used to guide research, out of a number of possible alternatives, and 
the value judgments of the researchers.”64   
There is a further diagnostic quality to this approach, one voiced by Tonry and 
Farrington:  “It is important to design evaluations to discover why strategies are 
immediately effective and why effectiveness may then decrease.”65  The Committee tells 
us that, “…measures of effectiveness fall into two categories:  1) those that construct an 
index of suitability, desirability, sufficiency (or of their absence); 2) those that monetize 
the welfare function in order to generate time discounted benefits to society and that then 
compare these benefits to costs by several more or less acceptable techniques.”66  And 
that, “A second more common approach to measures of effectiveness proceeds from the 
sum of the utility functions, i.e., the welfare function, and using market prices for inputs 
and products assigns time-discounted, dollar values to their benefits.”67
Hatry outlines a number of different evaluation approaches – some of which rely 
on the evaluative relationship between workload measures and physical standards – and 
each of which he dismisses in favor of an objectives-based evaluation matrix.68  Hatry 
cautions that, “Evaluation of program alternatives against their fundamental objectives 
may, in many instances, prove quite difficult.  In some cases, lower-level, or proxy, 
criteria, may need to be used.”69
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The benefits of a goal-model are preferential to the system-model.  “The 
measurement system evaluates a social unit’s success in terms of attaining its goals…the 
system model is concerned with the balance among the various component parts which 
yields higher achievements as compared to other combinations.  The difference between 
the two approaches is that the goal-model expects organizational effectiveness to increase 
with the increase of more means (resources) to the organizations (or social unit).  The 
system-model, on the other hand, perceives that there may be an in-balance in allocating 
a social unit resource to the goal activities and indirect non-goal activities that have to be 
met first in order to attain the goals set for a social unit.  In other words, determining the 
goals a social unit should reach (goal-model) is not sufficient for a social accounting 
system.”70  In this way, evaluation methods and criteria may be “interactive” rather than 
“sequential.”71  
For the purposes of the Prevention Triangle, it is first necessary to derive a series 
of indicators that can actually be measured.  As Hatry explains, “Multiple criteria are a 
complicating fact of life.  Programs should be evaluated against all relevant criteria.  
Qualitative measurement is appropriate wherever purely quantitative measurement is 
insufficient.”72  By way of an analogy, one can apply the example of purchasing a house.  
While several different measures can be used in making the selection, three or four 
general indicators come to mind; cost, location, size, and condition.  For most potential 
homeowners, the cost of a proposed residence is crucial, for obvious reasons.  Location is 
another important element; one may find a property that is within one’s price range, but if 
the potential homeowner lives in New York State, for instance, and the property is 
located in Florida, then issues such as commuting time to work and school will obviously 
play a role in the purchase decision process.  Size is another factor that needs to be 
addressed before a final sale can be reached.  This, like the other indicators, is predicated 
upon the contextual aspects of the potential homeowners’ lifestyle, family size, and space 
requirements.  If a couple without children intends to have children in the future, then a 
decision will need to be made if sufficient bedroom, bathroom and recreational space is 
available.  The  fourth  indicator,  condition,  is in view of the three previous measures, an  
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equally important consideration.  The condition of the property will determine the 
purchase price, as well as its ability to fulfill the expectations dictated by the previous 
indicators, most importantly among them, its livability.   
In his 2002 Subject Matter Expert (SME) brief, Pelfrey suggests the adoption of a 
Tiered Prevention model based on medical prevention theory as outlined by the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security: “Medical interventions, in individuals and populations, 
are commonly classified into three levels of prevention.”73  Pelfrey, who was drawing 
from the work of Froom and Benbasset, as well as upon studies by the US Preventive 
Services Task Force, defines the three categories of medical prevention as, “…primary 
prevention is to prevent the disease from occurring.  Secondary prevention attempts to 
reduce morbidity in pre-symptomatic subjects with established disease by its early 
detection and treatment.  Tertiary prevention is implemented on patients with a view of 
cure, palliation, rehabilitation, or prevention of recurrence or complications.”74
There are two aspects to Pelfrey’s model which are of interest to our present 
undertaking.  The first is the recognition that prevention possesses intrinsic gradations 
that gain relevancy through the application of situational and dispositional measures; and 
the second is that any prevention-based exercise program we implement must include 
these gradations as part of both the quantity to be measured, and the system through 
which such measurements will be accomplished.   
Tonry and Farrington additionally define prevention according to three situational 
and dispositional criteria, similar to that posed by Pelfrey, but defined by their end 
results.  “By developmental prevention, we mean interventions designed to prevent the 
development of criminal potential in individuals, especially those targeting risk and 
protective factors discovered in studies of human development.  By community 
prevention, we mean interventions designed to change the social conditions that influence 
offending in residential areas.  By situational prevention, we mean interventions designed 
to prevent the occurrence of crimes, especially by reducing opportunities and increasing 
risks.”75  In his 1983 article on situational crime prevention, Clarke established base 
criteria  that  included  surveillance,  target  hardening  and environmental management.76
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Although some scholars have taken a somewhat dim view of the benefit of 
educating the general public on crime prevention measures, there is little doubt that a 
broader awareness on the part of the public concerning the dangers of terrorism is a 
valuable tool in the terrorism prevention arsenal.  “…it is not surprising that crime-
prevention publicity campaigns that simply exhort people to take preventive measures by 
reminding them of risks of which they may already be aware seem largely ineffective, at 
least when measured in terms of behavioral change.”77  Studies by Bickman and Henry 
(1972) illustrated that, “…a substantial increase could be obtained in appropriate 
responses to shoplifting if the bystanders were given cues on what to look for and what to 
do.”78
Applying our earlier theoretical investigations into situational, dispositional, and 
experiential prevention, and keeping in mind the measures analogized in our residence 
analogy, it is possible for us to derive four base indicators for both prevention and the 
measure of prevention through the conduct of preparedness exercises.  These four 
measures are:  Timing, Diligence, Organization, and Diversity.  Before compiling the 
actual matrix, it is first necessary to define each of the four measures, and apply them to 
the four categories of Deterrence, Interdiction, Response and Redundancy. 
Timing refers to variable elements in the measurement of time.  It is exemplified 
by the number of exercises conducted by a jurisdiction over a period of time, as well as 
individual time and response components within the exercise.  Timing has both 
situational and dispositional influences on our understanding of prevention, as indicated 
by Tonry and Farrington, who write:  “Situational prevention, if successful, typically has 
immediate benefits, whereas the benefits of developmental prevention may be long 
delayed…The challenge to developmental researchers is to persuade policy makers to 
plan now to reduce crime in ten to twenty years time.”79
Diligence is defined as the observable degree or magnitude of work applied to the 
design and implementation of a jurisdiction’s prevention-based exercise program.  
Diligence, which can manifest itself as vigilance when applied to community policing 
programs, is not without its definitional and operational challenges, but past definitional 
standards do provide us with direction.  Clarke rightly points out the, “…difficulties in 
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recruiting enough people who are willing to give up time to exercise vigilance on behalf 
of others, and, more particularly, it is difficult to maintain enthusiasm.  This is seemingly 
because individuals encounter so few incidents of crime that the effort required begins to 
seem disproportionate to results.”80   
Here we are most interested in Clarke’s use of the word, “enthusiasm,” for that is 
precisely the quality on which diligence is founded.  Schneider posits that this enthusiasm 
is based upon a combination of factors, primarily confidence, knowledge, and a sense of 
communal interest; “Persons who have lived at their current address for a longer period 
of time are expected to know other persons in the neighborhood better, and, therefore, 
will be more likely to engage in protective neighboring.”81
Diligence is also observable when additional employees or resources are deployed 
to critical locations or assignments.  Clarke writes that, “The importance of ‘employee’ 
supervision can be further illustrated by the results of a Home Office study (Mayhew, et 
al. 1976) of vandalism on different types of double-decker buses…,” that indicated that 
incidents of vandalism increased on those buses staffed by only a driver, or a single 
conductor.82
Organization refers to the observable level to which a jurisdiction has designed 
and implemented offices, chains-of-command, and other administrative functions for the 
purpose of conducting prevention-based exercises.  Within the Interdiction, Response, 
and Redundancy categories, it translates into the organizational effectiveness of those 
groups and units tasked with various interdictional responsibilities; and to the 
organization, through planning and administrative oversight, of redundancy operations 
within a respective jurisdiction.  The establishment of the United States Department of 
Homeland Security (USDHS) is an example of organizational prevention.  “As a result, a 
number of Western governments, including those in France, England, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands, have established specialized agencies to develop, test, and evaluate crime 
preventative initiatives using other than law enforcement tools.”83  In the early 20th 
Century, Shaw and McKay’s (1942) Chicago School of Criminology “focused on 
ecological and community explanations for crime and promoted an emphasis on 
community organization as a crime prevention strategy.”84
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Diversity refers to the variety of components that are included in a prevention 
evaluation program.  Diversity can apply to the different types of weapons of mass 
disruption (WMD) that may be employed in a particular series of exercises, as well as to 
the variety of operational and organizational mechanisms deployed in response. “Most 
evaluations of community and situational prevention programs are quasi-experimental, 
with researchers measuring crime rates in areas before and after an uncontrolled or poorly 
controlled prevention strategy is implemented…It may be that a realistic target for a 
crime prevention measure is a 10 percent reduction in crime rather than a 50 percent 
reduction.  It is important that prevention studies should be designed with sufficient 
statistical power to detect the likely effects.”85
For this reason, the Prevention Triangle model eschews the traditional etiological 
(the fundamental social and psychological causes of crime) approaches to crime 
prevention by using defined proxies for criteria evaluation purposes.  The interagency 
approach to prevention, and hence its inclusion in a prevention evaluation program, can 
be traced to the concept of “coproduction,” or, “…a type of citizen activity that is 
intended to enhance the quality or quantity of public service (Whitaker, 1980; Parks, et 
al. 1981; Percy 1984; Brudney and England 1983).  Governments, for example, may pass 
laws requiring the use of seat belts in an attempt to decrease traffic deaths, but individual 
citizens actually determine whether seat belts are used and traffic deaths reduced.”86
Scholars have identified two types of coproduction:  joint and parallel 
coproduction.  Joint coproduction is a “collaborative effort in which citizens act in 
concert with a specific, identifiable, government program to produce goods or services, 
whereas the latter [parallel coproduction] is an activity undertaken by citizens on a 
parallel track with government but without any identifiable, direct, connection.”87  While 
a majority of federally sponsored prevention mandates are joint coproduction in nature, 
their influence on the parallel coproduction of similar objectives in the private sector, or 
among private organizations, can be positive for the purposes of enhancing the nation’s 
terrorism prevention standards. 
Past efforts at measuring the efficacy of social or crime prevention programs have 
generally relied on the use of proxies, or quantifiable behaviors, activities, or outputs that 
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can be tracked or monitored for the purposes of evaluation.  In a 2000 article published in 
The American Economic Review, Corman and Mocan employ a number of proxies in 
their efforts to provide a time-series analysis of the relationship between crime, 
deterrence, and drug abuse in New York City.  Drawing upon earlier studies,88 Corman 
and Mocan devise proxies based upon death rate (from drug use), “the drunkenness arrest 
rate, and the number of first admittances to mental hospitals for alcoholic psychosis as 
proxies for alcohol consumption…”89  Corman and Mocan adapt earlier proxies and 
employ a drug-use measure as a proxy for drug consumption.90  Doyle and Sambanis, in 
their article on peacebuilding, posit that, “Human costs also proxy the level of war-
generated hostility,”91 meaning that the number of personnel killed or wounded can be 
used as a measure for hostilities, or destructive intent.  Heidinsfield’s studies employed 
the “number of persons charged by the police” as a proxy in his evaluation of public 
morals and disturbances of the peace crimes,92 while Jobson and Schneck mirrored the 
Parratt model when they selected the proxies of hierarchical evaluation, crime rate, solve 
rate, perceived effectiveness, seriousness of crime, safety in environment, process 
behavior, task performance, importance of organization, and participation in 
community,93 for their crime program evaluation matrices. 
While Hatry warns against the excessive use of “…proxy or ‘lower-level’ criteria 
without at least briefly examining the relation of the proxies to the basic objectives…,”94 
the selection and use of proxies for evaluative purposes is critical to the success of the 
prevention mandate.  Initially, it permits for the collection of data; over time, this data 
can then be arranged into a baseline configuration, perhaps identifying in the process a 
new set of proxies that can be used to make even more finite observations of 
programmatic operations.  What is important in the measurement of terrorism prevention 
is that a start be made.  And proxies allow for that basis in the data collection process.  
We have already selected several proxies in the course of this study.  The four 
pillars of prevention – Deterrence, Interdiction, Response, and Redundancy – are proxies 
for the behaviors and activities that should occur as part of a prevention program.  The 
four evaluative criteria, as well, are represented by proxies, although these are of a more 
specific nature, and hence, application.  Hatry, who used proxies for the purposes of 
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evaluating nondefense public programs, indicates the need for such proxies:  “Evaluation 
of program alternatives against their fundamental objectives may, in many instances, 
prove quite difficult.  In some cases, lower-level, or proxy, criteria, may need to be 
used.”95
Although we have employed “lower-level” or specific proxies for our four pillar 
measures – Timing, Diligence, Organization, and Diversity – we still need to follow 
Hatry’s example:  “Where proxy criteria have been used, their deficiencies should be 
explicitly identified and care taken that the proxy criteria at least tend to be compatible 
with the more fundamental criteria.”96   
This exercise in compatibility, as it were, occurs within the final step of this 
process, the Prevention Triangle.   
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IX. THE PREVENTION TRIANGLE 
The Prevention Triangle employs proxies that reflect situational, dispositional, 
and experiential prevention theories, as well as evaluative criteria, to provide a model for 
the evaluation of terrorism prevention programs.  Drawn from the equidistant “Fire 
Triangle” model, where three components – fuel, heat and oxygen – are necessary to 
sustain fire (and if one of the elements are removed, fire will not occur, as indicated in 
our Third Principle), the Prevention Triangle contends that three principal components 
define the prevention mandate, and that the absence or underperformance of one or more 
of the three will ultimately affect the relative success of the overall prevention mandate.  
Although two of the Prevention Triangle’s three sides are graphically shorter than the 
third, they are metaphorically and operationally no less important to the success of the 
entire model.  Each component plays an equally important role in terms of its relation to 
the remaining two, and is known by the identifiers, “Objectives,” “Capabilities,” and 
“Hostilities.” 
As evidenced by the “Fire Triangle” example, triangles are popular models for 
graphically illustrating the various relationships between complex societal, economic, 
political, and military organizations.  In her analysis of the effectiveness of consumer 
product regulations, Oster attempts to, “…transform the deterrent effects estimated…into 
an estimate of the value of regulation…The analysis is an application of the Harberger 
‘triangle loss’ work familiar in estimating the costs of monopoly.”97  Doyle and Sambanis 
adopt the triangle model as part of their analysis of the effectiveness of international 
peacebuilding initiatives, with results derived from, “…the three dimensions of a triangle 
whose area is the ‘political space,’ or effective capacity, for building peace.”98  Our 
decision to select the triangle model was in large part dictated by the necessity of 
applying proxies to the identification of large societal factors, then configuring them in 
such a fashion as to yield a numerical relationship between them.  Because we 
determined that only three overarching proxies were required to effectively evaluate the 
prevention of terrorist activity, the triangle proved a readily adaptable graphical model. 
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These findings, therefore, lead us to the development of the Prevention Triangle, 
where (OB) Objectives are those (DI) Dispositional prevention objectives, be they 
administrative, political, economic, or social in design and implementation; (CP) 
Capabilities are those (SI) Situational prevention methods and resources that can be 
applied to the prevention of terrorist activities; and (HO) Hostilities, as a measure of (EI) 
or the Experiential prevention components within our prevention matrix. 
Like the Situational-Dispositional-Experiential model earlier illustrated, the 
Prevention Triangle contains a divisor, in this case (HO), which serves as an evaluative 
constant that is relevant or dynamically related to the (OB) and (CP) functions. 
A. OBJECTIVES, CAPABILITIES, AND HOSTILITIES 
In the Prevention Triangle, Objectives refers to those governmental, jurisdictional, 
or organizational goals that define the administrative components of the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security, as well as select individual strategies and tactics unique 
to asymmetric warfare, such as the disruption of terrorism financing networks and the 
need for a liberal democracy like the United States to account for the potentially 
deleterious impact of special legislation on its Constitutional traditions.  For the purposes 
of this study, we have chosen not to categorize Prevention itself as one of the Objectives; 
it is the primary output of the Prevention Triangle, and its use in the OB column would 
dilute the clarity of the proxies selected as evaluative criteria. 
Objectives have long been recognized as a viable component in the evaluation of 
social improvement and crime prevention programs.  In his 1970 article, “Measuring the 
Effectiveness of Nondefense Public Programs,” Hatry suggests that without a correlation 
between “basic governmental objectives,” and outputs, no accurate assessment or 
evaluation of the effectiveness of a public program can occur.99  In a nod to Machiavelli’s 
concept of the effectuale verité,100 Hatry contends that the “underlying objectives of the 
government” are measured by their “effects on people.”101  In an example to support his 
hypothesis, Hatry presents the case of a local economic development jurisdiction that 
eschews traditional evaluative measures such as the “numbers of businesses contacted” in 
favor of “the number of new industries established in the area.”102  Parratt’s “Scale to 
Measure Effectiveness of Police Functioning,” unveiled in 1938, relies on a tally of 
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“public approvals and disapprovals,”103 indicating an emphasis on evaluative criteria 
drawn from the quantifiable actuality of a program’s or organization’s operation.  And in 
their 2000 study Doyle and Sambanis posit that the Thucydidean and Hobbesian “trinity 
of motives (fear, honor, interest) are present in modern variations – security dilemmas, 
ethnic identity and/or ideological fervor, and loot seeking…,”104 each of which by 
extension represent proxies for the evaluation of Objectives and Hostilities. 
In terms of our study, government or jurisdictional objectives are fairly broad, and 
in keeping with our earlier contention, should be determined by the respective 
policymakers.  In his assessment of nondefense public programs, Hatry outlines several 
government objectives, among them, Personal Safety, Health, Intellectual Development, 
Community Environment, Economic Status, Leisure-Time opportunities, and 
Infrastructure arrangement.105  Hatry impresses upon his readership the importance of 
looking for, “…possible consequences, negative as well as beneficial, that government 
programs may have on objectives other than those at which the programs are explicitly 
aimed…”106
For the purposes of preventing terrorist attacks against the United States, 
Objectives (OB) within the Prevention Triangle model principally refer to those “Critical 
Mission Areas” stipulated by the National Strategy for Homeland Security.107  Reaching 
across a broad spectrum of American society, these objectives range from “Intelligence 
and Warning,” to the protection of “Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets,” to 
“Emergency Preparedness and Response.”  Within each of these segments are further 
objective delineations, smaller, more specific goals or “initiatives”108 that serve as 
proxies for the larger strategic objectives.  Almost every one of these initiatives is, in 
terms of their influence or impact on organizational viability or individual behavior, 
measurable for the purposes of evaluating prevention.   
Additionally, the National Strategy for Homeland Security identifies three 
primary “Strategic Objectives”:  the prevention of terrorist attacks in the United States; 
the reduction of the nation’s vulnerability; and the minimization and rapid recovery from 
those attacks that do occur.109  Although we support Hatry’s assessment that government 
policy and decision-makers should be responsible for identifying Objectives, the three 
 50
Strategic Objectives outlined above are simply too broad, too undefined in their actuality, 
to serve as effective measures of the prevention mandate.  The more specific objectives 
contained within the Critical Mission Areas are more easily applied to the Prevention 
Triangle model, and through the use of proxies, will be identified for the interests of this 
study. 
Capabilities (CP) refers to those physical or financial resources and assets that 
can be deployed or used within the operational components of a jurisdiction’s terrorism 
prevention mandate.  It may seem a simpler approach to categorize Capabilities as Tools, 
but as we shall see, Capabilities may serve as tools, but are in and of themselves much 
too expansive in actuality to be wielded as such.  As is the case with the Objectives 
component, Capabilities are partially defined by the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, within the “Foundations” section.  Serving as proxies for our evaluative 
purposes, these Capabilities extend from “Law” and “Science and Technology,” to 
“Information Sharing and Systems” and “International Cooperation.”110  The use of laws 
and their attendant judicial apparatuses, for instance, are an important Capability in our 
ability to successfully realize each of the counterterrorism Objectives outlined in the 
National Strategy.  In addition to its prosecutorial and deterrence value, the use of the 
Law and its evaluation as part of the prevention mandate permit the greater legitimization 
and acceptance of the nation’s global alliance against terrorism.  While it may be 
suggested that improvements to the Law for the purposes of combating terrorism rightly 
belong in the Objectives category (similar in example to the National Strategy’s 
recommendation that the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) “analytic capabilities” 
be enhanced),111 the true effectiveness of the Law, and hence our ability to evaluate it, 
can only be found in the efficacy of its application.  And it is for these and other reasons 
that we place Law within the Capabilities component. 
Personnel and material assets are also included within the Capabilities section.  
As indicated in Chapter One of our study, it has long been recognized by crime 
prevention theory and practice that the deployment of personnel and equipment – or the 
increase of personnel and equipment – is critical to the measurable success of crime 
prevention or deterrence programs.  “The results,” write Corman and Mocan of their 
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study into the relationship between crime, deterrence, and drug abuse in 1990’s New 
York City, “provide strong support for the deterrence hypothesis.  Murders, robberies, 
burglaries, and motor-vehicle thefts decline in response to increases in arrests; an 
increase in the size of the police force generates a decrease in robberies and 
burglaries.”112  While many definitional and operational differences exist between 
criminal and terrorist activity, sufficient evidence exists, as indicated in Chapter One, that 
the offensive and/or defensive deployment of additional personnel and equipment does 
yield convincing results, particularly when viewed in terms of situational prevention 
theory. 
The last of the Prevention Triangle’s three components, Hostilities is probably the 
most difficult to define and observe, and yet is equally likely to be the single most 
important factor in the terrorism prevention formula.  The use of Hostilities (HO) as an 
evaluative proxy during times of military or political crisis is not new, and has been 
employed by military officials and political theorists for centuries.  In many respects, the 
principal purpose of military intelligence is to determine hostile intent, and the 
consequences of not accurately assessing troop strength and/or the willingness and ability 
of an opponent to use military resources, can be catastrophic.113  In 2000, Doyle and 
Sambanis included a numerical assessment of Hostilities in their international 
peacebuilding model, one in which, “…pre- and postwar levels of local capacities interact 
with present international capacities to deliver specific postconflict outcomes.”114  For 
Doyle and Sambanis’ purposes, these outcomes were grouped under the rubric of 
“peacebuilding,” and were applied to the understanding that, “…peacebuilding is the 
front line of preventive action.”115  
As adapted from previous examples, the inclusion of the Hostilities component in 
the Prevention Triangle model allows us to more effectively observe the functionality of 
terrorism prevention Objectives.  Without Hostilities, or without an assessment of 
Hostilities, it is nearly impossible to have an understanding or quantification of 
prevention.  At first glance this may seem paradoxical; on the one hand, without  
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Hostilities there is nothing to prevent against; and on the other, if the attacks are being 
successfully prevented through the implementation of Objectives and the application of 
Capabilities, does this mean that Hostilities do not exist? 
As Hatry indicates in his example of how to best measure the effectiveness of 
child health programs, “…if…no defects could be corrected or alleviated, all the 
examination in the world would be useless and would be a waste of resources.”116  While 
Hatry’s argument revolves around whether or not a particular objective can be achieved 
(in his example, curing or alleviating child illness, for our purposes, the prevention of 
terrorist activity), it has further application to the understanding that without an 
assessment of Hostilities by both state and non-state participants, there cannot be an 
accurate evaluation of those measures taken to prevent terrorism.  For this reason, risk is 
defined as, “…the perceived probability of victimization whereas vulnerability refers to 
perceptions of the ability of the individual to ward off a would-be criminal if a crime 
were attempted.”117
Even if prevention is successfully practiced, Hostilities or risk will remain a 
viable component of the Prevention Triangle because the categorization not only extends 
to actual combat or the deployment of terrorist operatives, but also to intent.  Since threat 
is often defined as the sum of ability and intent, it is relatively easy to recognize its 
application to our present task.  Moreover, as evidenced by the nation’s experience in 
fighting the Second Gulf War, acts of terrorism or asymmetric warfare can be waged 
against military targets with considerable destructive effectiveness.  By strict definitional 
standards, these attacks are not precisely of a terrorist nature, except that their relentless 
occurrence and potentially steep death tolls can serve as a catalyst for public opposition, 
as well as a manifestation of tactical disruption, thereby decreasing the operational 
efficiency of the respective campaign. 
It is for these reasons that, conceptually and mathematically, we have chosen to 
place Hostilities within the Prevention Triangle’s hypotenuse, or its longest side.   
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Hostilities therefore become the divisor – both metaphorically and in actuality - by which 
the remaining sides, Objectives and Capabilities, are evaluated.  The resulting formula 
reads: 
PV = OB + CP ÷ HO 
 
where PV represents Prevention, OB represents the Objectives coefficient, CP represents 
the Capabilities coefficient, and HO represents Hostilities.   
Each of the three categories, OB, CP, and HO, are given coefficients based upon 
the measures taken from the application of the evaluative criteria – Timing (TM), 
Diligence (DG), Organization (OR), and Diversity (DV) – to their respective prevention 
programs.  For instance, Objectives (OB): 
Timing.  How timely has a jurisdiction been in identifying its terrorism 
prevention Objectives?    
  A complete and detailed analysis of jurisdictional Objectives was  
completed in:  (specify days, months, or years) 
Diligence.  How diligent or determined has a jurisdiction been in identifying its 
terrorism prevention objectives? 
  During the time period specified in the Timing category, how many people 
were hired, or assigned, to prepare terrorism prevention Objectives? 
Organization.  What organizational changes or enhancements have been 
undertaken, including financial administration, to prepare terrorism prevention 
Objectives? 
During the time period specified in the Timing category, has a jurisdiction 
instituted a terrorism prevention program, or instituted policies designed to 
facilitate the identification of terrorism prevention Objectives? 
Diversity.  What different strategies or tactics has a jurisdiction employed in 
identifying its terrorism prevention Objectives? 
During the time period specified in the Timing category, how many 
different strategies or tactics has a jurisdiction instituted?  
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In the example of Capabilities (CP), the evaluators are similar in presentation, but 
are designed to provide an assessment of a jurisdiction’s respective Capabilities as they 
pertain to the prevention of terrorism.  These include the number of public safety 
personnel (police, fire, emergency medical services, emergency management) either hired 
or deployed in the implementation of terrorism prevention Objectives; the time in which 
it took to acquire and deploy equipment designed to augment terrorism prevention 
efforts; the type and variety of personnel and equipment that was deployed and acquired 
as part of a terrorism prevention Objective; and other measures associated with 
Deterrence, Interdiction, Response, and Redundancy planning and operations. 
For each category, a numerical coefficient, obtained from a predetermined chart, 
is entered.  These are then tallied to provide the individual OB and CP coefficients.  For 
the purposes of this study, we have assumed that the coefficient zero (0) is entirely 
possible, but not probable.  We have therefore accounted for zero (0) in the chart by 
setting the comparative ranges at 0 to 9, 10-19, 20-29, etc, depending upon the evaluative 
criteria.  The coefficient ranges for Timing, for example, start at 0, but range to 30 days, 
31-60 days, etc, in keeping with the accepted unit of measurement for the individual 
criteria. 
Once the individual OB and CP coefficients have been determined, these are 
added, and then divided by the coefficient assigned to the HO evaluation.  Like the OB 
and CP factors, HO is determined by an assessment of available intelligence concerning 
Hostilities, as well as an assessment based upon the four evaluative criteria, Timing, 
Diligence, Organization, and Diversity.  The theoretical basis for the assessment of 
hostilities as part of a crime prevention program more or less informs most of the 
theoretical literature on the subject, as evidenced by Tonry and Farrington who urge 
studying “local patterns of crime” before “devising prevention strategies appropriate to 
local problems in the light of these analyses....”118  If one recalls our earlier discussion of 
anti-piracy precautions taken aboard those merchant vessels operating in pirate-infested 
waters, and their applicability to a limited or, as Pelfry would suggest, a tiered approach 
to terrorism prevention, then the efficacy of this approach can be readily understood.  
When applied to maritime piracy, the “patterns of local crime” indicate that the pirates 
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are primarily interested in money, and that armed attempts to resist piratical activities 
often result in the deaths of crew members, and/or the vessel’s loss.  The owners of these 
vessels have decided, therefore, to specify objectives that are achievable, and are 
informed by the previous observable behavior of the Hostilities (in this case, marine 
pirates) in order to achieve their respective level of prevention. 
Owing to the difficulties inherent in obtaining an accurate assessment of an 
opponent’s Objectives and Capabilities, these are not directly tallied as part of the 
Prevention Triangle process.  If it were possible to ascertain coefficients for Objectives 
and Capabilities, then we might possess the ability to derive PV from a comparison of the 
PV product for the United States or other jurisdictions, and what the PV product would 
be for our opponents.  One must make the assumption that just as the United States seeks 
to prevent acts of terrorism, terrorist organizations may likewise desire to prevent the 
United States from engaging in proactive prevention programs – which would be, for the 
purposes of this study, considered a form of terrorist prevention. 
As designed, the Prevention Triangle’s HO coefficient is derived from an 
assessment based upon our four evaluative criteria: 
Timing.  How timely has an opponent been in launching terrorist attacks?  
X [numerical value] of terrorist attacks were launched within a specified 
time period (specify days, months, or years). 
Diligence.  How diligent or determined has a terrorist organization been in 
planning and implementing its terrorist attacks? 
During the time period specified in the Timing category, how many people 
(non-terrorist) were killed or injured in the identified terrorist operations? 
Organization.  What organizational changes or enhancements have been 
undertaken, including financial administration, within terrorist organizations?  
During the time period specified in the Timing category, has a terrorist 
organization developed internal organizational capabilities, or established 
overseas cells?  If yes, how many of these organizations or cells have been 
established?  This value represents the Organizational coefficient. 
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Diversity.  What different strategies or tactics has a terrorist organization 
employed in achieving its objectives? 
During the time period specified in the Timing category, how many 
different strategies or tactics has a terrorist organization instituted?  This 
figure can be derived from an assessment of the different types of weapons 
used (i.e., car bombs, sniper attacks, explosive devices, assassinations, 
etc.) 
The values for each are tallied, then added together under the evaluative formula 
[HO = TI + DG + OR + DV] to derive the HO coefficient.  Under the Prevention Triangle 
model, the HO value is then inserted into the equation [PV = OB + CP ÷ HO], thereby 
yielding the PV product.  This coefficient can, in turn, be used to measure prevention 
according to whatever time span is supported by data collection and analysis efforts, and 




The Prevention Triangle draws upon three primary outputs of prevention theory, 
namely, Interdiction, Response, and Redundancy, but following the addition of evaluation 
theories, eschews these in favor of three measures, Objectives, Capabilities, and 
Hostilities.  The three traditional pillars of terrorism prevention have, through practice 
and theory, been adapted from crime prevention outputs involving, “…deterrence, 
rehabilitation, primary prevention, or incapacitation…”119  Professor William V. Pelfrey, 
in a draft brief prepared for Subject Matter Experts (SME) dealing with prevention, 
outlines three categories, “…used in framing a Prevention Typology…Deterrence, 
Preemption, and Protection.”120   
As evidenced in the preceding sections, the most effective evaluation systems 
have been those that observe a broad scale of indicators, including those culled from 
across the social and governmental spectrum.  “Historical analysis tells us, however, that 
policing has always consisted of a complex division of labour; a varying balance between 
public elements, private elements, and those ‘hybrid’ elements whose status is neither 
unambiguously private nor unambiguously public.”121   
For our purposes, this assessment prompts a reconsideration of the limited 
application of limited indicators in favor of an expanded definitional understanding and 
an increased number of specific indicators.  If, for instance, we hold to Tonry and 
Farrington’s assertion that, “Collaboration with public health practitioners may be useful 
in expanding the range of measures of crime,”122 then the evaluation approach to 
prevention must be enhanced to both include and observe an example of the interagency 
approach to prevention, and to the specific indicators unique to the health and medical 
function.  Tonry and Farrington conclude that, “More complex prevention programs 
involving several different elements…are more difficult to evaluate but perhaps have a 
greater chance of being effective in reducing offending than programs based on only one 
type of prevention technique.”123
 58
Although no study into any subject is ever as comprehensive as we might prefer, 
we have in the course of this study determined several important aspects of prevention 
theory and evaluation that we believe may be applicable to the present alliance against 
terrorism.  During the course of this essay, we have determined that based upon previous 
crime prevention examples, it is possible to prevent or mitigate select acts of terrorism.  
We have come to an understanding that prevention must be defined in terms of 
situational, dispositional, and experiential factors, and its components allied along both 
axes in order to be effectively measured.  We have established proxies that allow us to 
define objectives and capabilities-based factors within the concept of prevention - 
Interdiction, Response, and Redundancy.  And we have illustrated how each of these four 
intermediate outcomes fulfills some aspect of the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, and is measurable through observable operational behavior and decision-
making. 
We have also illustrated how prevention is of a situational, dispositional, and 
experiential nature, and therefore can be defined by the three rubrics inspired by crime 
prevention theory.  We have reviewed different schools of evaluation and coproduction 
theory and from this process developed a set of evaluative criteria – Timing, Diligence, 
Organization, and Diversity – that are based upon the effect these prevention measures 
would have on the nation and its participating jurisdictions.  We have also surveyed 
various concepts regarding the use of proxies, and the numerous values and difficulties 
inherent in their application to the evaluation of prevention programs.  This is one of 
those areas where additional research is required, and a full list of all possible criteria 
developed.  Finally, we joined the theoretical aspects of crime and terrorism prevention 
with the practical evaluative application of the Prevention Triangle.  By using the formula 
derived from the Prevention Triangle’s components, we believe an accurate measure of 
our national prevention index can be produced. 
During the course of our own hero’s journey, we also discovered a few other 
insights, each of which has a bearing on the success of the national prevention mandate.  
Because documents such as the National Strategy for Homeland Security are instrumental 
factors in determining the nation’s terrorism prevention objectives, it is similarly 
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necessary that the specific mission areas within the National Strategy be updated on an 
annual basis.  In addition to being an example of joint coproduction, this practice would 
permit a more structured approach to the setting of Objectives, in that the Objectives 
could be worded and organized in order to better facilitate quantification and evaluation.   
We also came to an understanding that, as evidenced in previous studies of crime 
prevention programs, terrorism prevention requires baseline data, accumulated over many 
years, in order to be accurately evaluated.  The most important decisions to be made at 
present concerning prevention is the selection of a uniform, applicable method for 
evaluating prevention mandates, and the collection of baseline data that can be used for 
the refinement of evaluative criteria, and perhaps, even the determination of future 
objectives.   
We should not fear this approach, or be deterred from pursuing it because it 
appears incomplete, or relies on too much material that is as yet undefined.  The most 
important strategy as applied to prevention is the one that allows us to start the process.  
In part, through the promulgation of the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and 
the identification of prevention objectives, the United States and its constituent 
jurisdictions have taken that important first step.  The challenge now remaining is to 
move beyond this start, to enter the process itself, and actively seek improvements to our 
prevention objectives and capabilities through an evaluation of their ongoing existence.   
The addition of experiential prevention into the Prevention Triangle model is a 
sound development in the formulation of a prevention evaluation system.  It allows us to 
establish a progression, both theoretical and in the actuality of the equations that result, 
that leads to a common transitory benefit.  Essentially, we have seen how Situational 
Prevention is equivalent to “How,” and that this, in turn, leads to an assessment of 
Capabilities.  Dispositional is equivalent to “When,” and is commensurate with the 
Objectives leg in the Prevention Triangle.  And Experiential Prevention is equivalent to 
“Why,” and is parallel to the role of Hostilities in the Prevention Triangle concept.   
If we accept this logical model, then there is a paradoxical aspect to this 
undertaking that yields a startling and perhaps ominous insight.  If we hold with the 
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existence of experiential prevention and its influence on the effectiveness of dispositional 
and situational prevention, then without any terrorist activity or attacks, we would not be 
able to support the dispositional will or the situational implementation that is necessary 
for the Prevention Triangle to work.  As seen in our Third Principle, the removal or 
negation of any one leg in the Theoretical Prevention Triangle seriously impacts the 
operation of the other two; this is logically possible since the three are, by virtue of their 
respective dynamics, responsible for fulfilling different objectives within the Prevention 
Triangle concept.  The degree to which each leg fails is, of course, contingent upon its 
relative position before failure, and the circumstances under which it did not achieve its 
objectives.  Should situational failure occur, prevention is not successful.  And should 
experiential prevention, as the longest leg of the triangle, not succeed, then both 
dispositional and situational prevention measures have a much greater probability of 
failure because they are, by virtue of their positions within the Prevention Triangle 
model, dependent upon the experiential or awareness function. 
Although our logical proofs indicate that without experiential prevention, or 
without Hostilities, we cannot have evolving levels of prevention, it does appear that in 
order to effectively prevent 90% of terrorist attacks, we must endure the other 10%.  And 
since we know through the collective experience of modern life that nothing is 100%, or 
ever entirely preventable, we should consider this precept as an explanation for why 
terrorist attacks will continue to occur, and of how our prevention mandates can 
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